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During the Cold War, Canada and the United States worked together to create a mutual defense
program to protect the North American continent from a potential Soviet attack. As the Soviet
Union and the United States entered into a nuclear arms race, the military defense of North
America became absolutely imperative. By 1962, technology had been developed enabling both
super powers to launch missiles over long distances. There was a dramatic shift from air bombers
to missiles during the Cold War because missiles could be launched from farther away and had a
larger capability for destruction. Canadians and the Americans soon realized that the only way to
truly defend the North American continent from Soviet nuclear missiles was to create their own
nuclear defense systems. The newly developed long- range missiles were called inter-continental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) because they could be launched over continents having a range
between 6,000-9,300 miles. 1 The Soviets likewise developed similar technology, and by 1958,
they had the capability to launch an attack on the United States from Soviet soil. This new
technology completely revolutionized the way nations’ conceptualized war and also the ways in
which nations sought to defend themselves militarily.
Despite shared interests in mutual defense, Canadians had a notably different perspective
of the Cold War than Americans and played a distinctly different role in the war. The Canadian
Arctic became the central focus of these converging yet distinct ideas of North American
defense. The quickest route for any assault upon the United States would have been over the
Canadian Arctic. Inevitably, this placed Canada in the middle of a potential nuclear holocaust as
tensions continued to ramp up between 1949 and 1963. Like all nations in the emerging bipolar
world constructed by U.S. and Soviet policies, Canadian statesmen had to make important and
difficult geopolitical decisions. Due to the fact that the nations shared a border and similar
1
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political perspectives the U.S. and Canada were natural allies. But this natural alliance did not
always translate into smooth bilateral action or even mutual diplomatic agreement during key
moments of international tension. Working through these tensions remained a pressing issue in
North American diplomacy during the Cold War. The joint defense between these two North
American countries is historically significant because despite the weakness of personal
diplomacy between the nations’ leaders, state diplomacy was remarkably successful in protecting
the continent from perceived threats and in defusing the tensions of the Cold War.

Building a Partnership: Origins of Joint Defense between the United States and Canada
The cooperative tradition between Canada and the United States dates back to the early twentieth
century when the United States and Great Britain began a series of international talks to
discharge festering conflicts between the two powers on the North American continent. This
cooperation between the United States and Great Britain did not always translate into
comfortable relations between the United States and Canada. During the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, Canada was fearful of the United States because of its expansionist
tradition (Manifest Destiny) and the expressed desires of the United States to become the
dominant continental power.
The tension between the United States and Canada was more than just diplomatic.
Canada feared “Americanization” of their English speaking and French speaking cultures.
Canada had only become an independent nation in 1867 thus it was far weaker economically and
politically than their neighbor, thus making it vulnerable to an invasion if the United States
sought to extend its borders northward. Canadians speculated that the United States would try to
invade Canada since as of World War I they were an expansionist country. Knowing that the
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U.S. had a larger population, stronger economy and had a history of aggression, Canadians had
much to be concerned about. A 1921 Canadian Army record reported the following defense
scheme in the event of “probable action of the United States”:
The main objective of the United States force would undoubtedly be Montreal and
on to Ottawa. The next important objective of the United States would be the
occupation of the Ontario Peninsula including the cities of Hamilton and
Toronto…the grain growing Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta
which now have a large percentage of Americans, are especially attractive to the
United States, and there is just a possibility that they might make the conquest of
these Provinces the ultimate objective of their campaign… 2
The fact that Canada’s Army drew up military counter measures is evidence of the fear that
Canada had of the United States. 3 According to Canadian historians John H. Thompson and
Stephen J. Randall in Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, in the early twentieth
century, “British strategic planners viewed war with the United States ‘a contingency which,
however improbable, is not impossible,’ but they secretly conceded that a successful defense of
Canada was impossible.” 4 Even a powerful naval country such as Britain knew that they could
not possibly help Canada defend itself against the United States if the U.S. were to invade.
However, the assumed failure to defend Canada is not as important as the fact that both Britain
and Canada felt that some kind of defense was nonetheless necessary. The fear of a potential
invasion from the United States, as it had done in the War of 1812, became a barrier that the U.S.
and Canada had to overcome in order for joint defense to become a reality.
World War II became an open stage for Canada to begin overcoming its fear of the
United States. With the whole world in chaos, the United States was the least of Canada’s fears.
2
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Due to its historic relationship with Great Britain, Canada was a key conduit for the cooperation
between Great Britain and the United States during WWII. Canada’s role as an independent
voice in building a cooperative relationship with the United States emerged in a fuller force with
the outbreak of World War II. This wartime work eventually had important implications for the
defense of North America and the rising importance of the Arctic in geopolitics.
Prior to WWII, Canada did not see a need to defend its northern Arctic border. From a
military point of view, the land in the Arctic was useless and its climate could prevent anyone
from trying to capture the territory even if it did have intrinsic value. The authors of Arctic Front
describe Lester Pearson’s “scorched ice” approach to defending the Arctic, immediately
following WWII. Lester Pearson was Minister of External Affairs during Prime Minister
Diefenbaker’s administration. He later became Diefenbaker’s successor and served as Prime
Minister from 1963-1968. Pearson advocated for the following approach to defending the Arctic:
“If you left the Arctic alone, as a deserted wasteland of ice and snow, it would be useless to the
enemy, which would have to fight the natural elements simply to survive, never mind an
attack.” 5 It was not until the Soviet Union and the United States entered into a nuclear arms race
that Canada found itself with a defenseless northern flank.
In 1940, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt met in Ogdensburg, New York, where they agreed to a mutual defense policy known
as the Ogdensburg Agreement. The Ogdensburg Agreement was one of the first joint defense
actions taken between Canada and the United States out of which the Permanent Joint Board on
Defence was created. In the agreement, the nations agreed that, “This Permanent Joint Board on
Defence shall commence immediate studies relating to the sea, land and air problems, including
5
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personnel and material. It will consider in the broad sense of defense of the north half of the
Western Hemisphere.” 6 The creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence created a
precedent in the defense policy that the United States and Canada adhered to during the Cold
War years as they sought to defend themselves from the Soviet Union.
H.L. Keenleyside (1898-1992) was the Secretary of the Canadian Section of the
Permanent Joint Board on Defence (1940-1944). 7 In a 1960 journal entry in the Canadian
International, Keenleyside recounted the political relationship that developed between the
United States and Canada during WWII. Although the time period precedes the Cold War, this
journal entry is helpful to understanding the preexisting military cooperation between the two
allies. In this article Keenleyside notes that in August of 1938 in Woodridge, Prime Minister
King vowed a Canadian alliance to the United States stating:
We too have our obligations as a good and friendly neighbour, and one of them is
to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or
possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it and that, should the
occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by
land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory. 8
This statement was essential to creating a cooperative political relationship between the two
countries. U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt responded to King’s speech in an address he
gave at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario in 1938: “I give to you assurance that the
people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by

6
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any other Empire.” 9 WWII marked the realization that the two countries had the joint
responsibility to defend the western hemisphere.
During WWII, Canada and the United States utilized their new joint defense to bring an
end to German and Japanese aggression. Canada provided everything from military supplies to
ground troops to aid the Allied effort against Germany in the Atlantic theater. One of its most
notable contributions was its role in the invasion of Normandy during the D-Day landings of
June 1944 which 14,000 Canadians stormed Juno Beach and helped the Allies push further into
German occupied France. 10 Canada also partnered with the United States in the atomic energy
research known as the Manhattan Project, which developed the notorious atomic bomb that
helped end the war in Japan in 1945. 11 Canada’s involvement in this research was defined in the
Quebec Agreement of 1943 between the United States and the United Kingdom that established
the nuclear weapons program (known as Tube Alloys in the UK). 12 Although Canada was a selfruling nation at this point (Britain had granted Canada sovereignty in 1931), Great Britain still
heavily influenced Canada’s foreign policy. 13 Therefore, when Great Britain agreed to the
Quebec Agreement, Canada and the other Commonwealth nations were inclined to join the
nuclear project.

9
Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Address at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.," August 18, 1938.
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15525.
10
D.W. Lane. "The Canadians On D-Day." Juno Beach. http://www.junobeach.info/. December 2014.
11
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. "Canada's historical role in developing nuclear weapons."
http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/fact-sheets/Canadas-contribution-to-nuclear-weaponsdevelopment.cfm.
12
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Canada's historical role in developing nuclear weapons."
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own foreign policy.
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Before the war ended, Canada’s Department of External Affairs developed a report on
Post-War Canadian Defence Relationship with the United States that was created on January 23,
1945. This report concluded:
That the defences of Canada should be closely co-ordinated with those of the
United States after the war; that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence will
continue to be a valuable means of facilitating this co-ordination; that the relations
between the United States and the USSR are of special concern to Canada. 14
This report highlights the importance that Canada placed on its cooperation with the United
States. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was a platform for this new cooperation. Even
before the war ended, Canada recognized that it would have to play a role in maintaining the
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Shortly after the war, in another example of successful state-level diplomacy, the United
States and Canada created the Military Cooperation Committee in 1946. This committee met
twice a year for the military staffs to meet and to discuss the state of the joint defense program
between the two allies. 15 On June 5, 1946, the two nations met to discuss the Joint CanadianUnited States Basic Security Plan. This plan called for a joint mission that committed the two
countries to the following: “to defend the territory of Canada, Newfoundland and the United
States, including Alaska, and to protect the vital sea and air communications associated
therewith, in order to ensure the ultimate security of Canada and the United States.” The Joint
Basic Security Plan was vital to strengthening relations between the two nations during the postwar era. To achieve the goal of the missions, each nation was given a plan to meet the

14

“Post-War Canadian Defence Relationship with the United States: General Considerations," Department
of External Affairs Files (January 23, 1945). "Report of the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities
Problems,” in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, vol. 3 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press 1972) 375.
15
National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces. "The Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship."
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-canada-u-s-defence-relationship/hob7hd8s.

8

requirements of joint tasks. For example, one of the joint tasks assigned was the defense of vital
Canadian and United States territories from air attack. To achieve this goal, the Canadian Air
Force, Army, and Navy were given specific instructions to co-operate with the United States and
provide the necessary facilities and forces to achieve common protection. Meanwhile, the United
States’ Army, Army Air Force, and Navy were given the same instructions to support their
Canadian counterparts. 16 The Joint Basic Security Plan helped lay the groundwork for the joint
defense between the United States and Canada during the Cold War.
Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union grew after WWII as the United
States launched the international community into a nuclear arms race with the dropping of the
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. A new need for military deterrence
formed out of the fear that the Soviet Union would attack the United States or its northern ally,
Canada. 17 Historian Berry Zeller noted in On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of
Arctic Sovereignty that during this time defense planners argued for a strong joint military effort
between the U.S. and Canada not only for security issues but also for sovereignty issues. 18 Much
of this joint military effort focused on the Canadian Arctic and North Atlantic.

The Beginnings of the Cold War in North America
Canada’s Cold War did not originate in the Arctic; it first emerged in Canada’s capital in Ottawa
with the 1945 “Gouzenko Affair.” Depending on how one dates the beginning of the Cold War,

16
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one could argue that Canada actually faced the tensions of the new Cold War before the United
States did. Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet cipher clerk, defected to Canada in September 1945
revealing to the Canadian government of the existence of a spy ring within their own ranks.
Gouzenko revealed top-secret Soviet intelligence in return for Canada’s police protection. When
the government learned that there were more Soviet spies in Canada, it raised paranoia among
the public. In an attempt to quickly bring order to the chaos, the government invoked its wartime
powers to detain, interrogate and prosecute those suspected of being communist Soviet spies. 19
The government even went as far as suspending habeas corpus. 20 One month following his
defection, on October 19, 1945, Gouzenko made an official announcement to the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP):
During my residence in Canada I have seen how the Canadian people and their
Government, sincerely wishing to help the Soviet people, sent supplies to the
Soviet Union, collected money for the welfare of the Russian people, sacrificing
the lives of their sons in the delivery of supplies across the ocean and instead of
gratitude for the help rendered, the Soviet Government is developing espionage
activity in Canada, preparing to deliver a stab in the back of Canada all this
without the knowledge of the Russian people. Convinced that such double-faced
politics of the Soviet Government towards the democratic countries do not
conform with the interests of the Russian people and endanger the security of
civilization, I decided to break away from the Soviet regime and to announce my
decision openly. I am glad that I found the strength within myself to take this step
and to warn Canada and the other democratic countries of the danger which hangs
over them. 21

19
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The resulting fallout became known as the Gouzenko Affair, which launched Canada into the
Cold War by raising public paranoia and political tensions between Canada and the Soviet Union
only two months after WWII ended. 22
The largely perceived emerging crisis of Soviet aggression forced Canadians to
reevaluate their position within North America. The historic fear among Canadians of US
aggression northward now seemed to pale in comparison with the threat of Soviet aggression.
The cooperation between the United States and Canada during WWII quickly evolved into its
new Cold War context. As such, the “front” of the war now moved into the North Atlantic and
the Canadian Arctic. In Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America,
Shelagh Grant argues that the postwar era perpetuated Canada’s paranoia towards a Soviet
nuclear attack, which led to a conservative movement towards national defense. Grant also
argues that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was not Canada’s only concern. The United
States, Canada’s closest ally, was actually a primary Canadian Arctic concern during the postwar
era as the U.S. sought land claims in the Arctic. Grant states, “With Canada’s large size, small
population and limited financial resources, the risks attached to military dependence upon a
powerful neighbor [the United States] at times seemed greater that the possibility of an enemy
attack from the north.” 23 Although this was indeed an important concern for Canada, Canadian
fear of the Soviet Union (USSR) was far more severe, thus Canadian policy makers focused
more on dealing with the threat of the USSR. During the Cold War, Canada had to defend itself
against two superpowers in the Arctic; both the Soviet Union and the United States posed real
threats, in Canada’s eyes. If Canada accepted the help of the United States in defending Canada’s

22
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northern border from the Soviets, Canada would inevitably allow the U.S. a military presence in
the Arctic and therefore the opportunity to claim Canadian lands, a reality that Canada had
resisted for more than seventy years. This concept is known as “defense against help” and is
crucial to understanding Canadian defense decisions during the Cold War. 24 This new North
American cooperation, built upon precedents set during WWII but reached a new level of
urgency because of the Gouzenko Affair, emerged not at the level of personal diplomacy
between national leaders (as it had during WWII between King and Roosevelt), but at the level
of institutional and agency cooperation. Evidence of this cooperation can be seen in the creation
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, missile defense, the creation of the
North American Air Defense Command known as NORAD in 1957, the BOMARC missile
controversy in 1963, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1963. 25 Historians refer to this era of USCanadian relations as the “era of convergence,” because the cooperation between the two nations
helped protect North America from Soviet threats. 26

NATO
During the 1940s, the United States changed its pre- war foreign policy approach from
“isolationism” to a collective security approach. Future President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953)
advocated for the United States stay out of European affairs; but involvement soon became
inevitable after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. During the war, the U.S. and its
European allies learned the benefits of having global allies for defense and security measures.

24
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For Europe, NATO was a foreign policy tool to keep the United States’ attention and focus in
European affairs in the post-WWII war era. 27 Once the war ended, the United States was ready to
formally enter into a collective security pact in hopes of preventing another world war.
In 1949, the United States and Canada, along with other Western European nations,
entered a collective security effort against the Soviet Union known as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). NATO was a military alliance amongst the Western powers that
committed each nation to defending the collective if any one of their members was attacked. This
was a direct response to the increasing tensions between the democratic/capitalist world and the
growing Soviet-led communist world. Western powers feared that if one nation fell to
communism, the other nations would follow suit. This idea was known as the domino effect and
it largely influenced the foreign policy of the Western powers during the Cold War. As the
Soviet Union expanded its borders to puppet regimes, fears of another world war began to
emerge as tensions between communist nations and democratic nations climaxed. It was hoped
that NATO would act as a deterrent for nations to wage war.
The allied powers of the West created NATO to provide mutual-defense against Soviet
aggression and to maintain the peace. If the Soviet Union attacked one nation of NATO, the
members would consider it an attack against all NATO nations. 28 NATO served as an incentive
for the Soviet Union to maintain peace, knowing that the alternative could lead to another world
war. As noted by Thompson and Randall, Louis St. Laurent (Prime Minister of Canada from

27

Geir Lundestad. "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952." Journal of Peace
Research 23, no. 3 (September 1986). http://www.ies.be/files/private/17)%20Lundestad%20%20Empire%20by%20Invitation.pdf.
28
United States Department of State: Office of the Historian. "North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949)."
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato

13

1948-1957), viewed NATO as an “’overwhelming preponderance of moral force,’ as well as
economic and military power.’” 29
As stated in the treaty, the primary objective of the “moral force” was to commit the
member nations to a determination:
To safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are
resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of
peace and security. 30
Canada’s involvement in NATO proved to be crucial for the United States for three reasons:
geography, a 40 year tradition of cooperation, and cross-border decision dynamics. 31 The United
States and Canada share a border that not only defines their geographic relationship, but also
their political and military relationship. Due to the shared geography, the United States and
Canada were mutually responsible for the defense of the North American continent. If Canada
were to come under attack, the United States would be inevitably drawn into the conflict due to
the close proximity of its ally. When the Cold War began between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
Canada was similarly caught between the two nations. 32 In this fight, the Canadian Arctic
became potential middle battleground. As mentioned previously, Canada’s Cold War began with
the Gouzenko Affair; however, Canada chose to become more involved in the war, knowing that
neutraility would not be an effective defense measure against the two world powers. Instead,
Canada willingly chose to partner with the United States in the defense of the continent and
democratic ideals.

29

As quoted in, Thompson and Randall. Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, p.192.
North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81 Cong. 1 sess, 3 pts.
(Washington, DC., 1949), 1:1-4.
31
Armstrong, Armstrong, and Wilcox, Canada and the United States, 224.
32
Armstrong, Armstrong, and Wilcox, Canada and the United States, 223.
30

14

Lester Pearson, minister of External Affairs during the creation of the treaty, later
recalled:
The North Atlantic Treaty was born out of fear and frustration; fear of the
aggressive and subversive policies of communism and the effect of those policies
on our own peace, security and well-being; frustration over the obstinate
obstruction by communist states of our efforts to make the United Nations
function effectively as a universal security system. 33
Pearson’s reflection provides a unique perspective of Canada’s primary purpose for signing the
treaty. Canada signed the treaty out of fear of the spread of communism as well as frustration of
communist nations trying to thwart the global movement of the U.N. to bring peace and security
to the world. By signing the treaty, Canada chose to act as international player without direct or
even indirect oversight from Great Britain. Partnering with the United States and the other
NATO members was the best way for Canada to achieve its own political agenda as well as
defend itself from the Soviet Union.
For the United States, the creation of NATO was not only a response to the international
Cold War but also to its own domestic Cold War, which emerged in the late 1940s under the
guise of the “Red Scare” that infected the nation. The Red Scare was a paranoia and fear of
communism that swept across the nation like wildfire in the 1940s and the 1950s. The fear of
communists, or “reds,” was a result of the emerging Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union after WWII. 34 Communist paranoia within the American government became
evident with the creation of the Special House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities
in 1938, later renamed the House of Un-American Activities (HUAC) in 1945. HUAC was
responsible for investigating those accused of communist-like behavior. In 1950, former State
33
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Department official Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury for lying about this involvement with a
Soviet spy ring. 35 Later in 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy further instigated this Red Scare by
accusing 205 State Department officials of being communists.36 In his 1953 letter to President
Eisenhower, McCarthy accused James B. Conant, a High Commissioner in Germany, of being
unqualified for the job due to his favoring of communist ideals:
Let me make it clear that I do not accuse Mr. Conant of being either Communist
or pro-Communist. However, I strongly feel that his innocent statement about
Communist activities in education and about the presence of communism in his
own faculty indicate a woeful lack of knowledge the vicious and intricate
Communist conspiracy. Certainly it doesn’t show any qualifications for the task
of safeguarding the American Embassy at Bonn against Communist penetration,
nor with the task of meeting the Communist threat in Western Germany 37
McCarthy’s accusations of communism at home within the U.S. government fueled the public
paranoia that created the Red Scare. The Red Scare put pressure on the United States to make a
bold move to bring about the end of communism. For the United States, NATO was in part a
domestic political maneuver to stop the outbreak of fear and paranoia within U.S. borders, and
also a foreign policy tool designed to deter and contain communism in Eastern Europe. The
United States was late in providing troops on the ground in both WWI and WWII, so it had to
convince Europeans that they would respond more quickly to Soviet aggression. Yet, within the
realm of international politics, NATO also related to U.S. needs in North America. It was crucial
to the United States that Canada joined NATO to better protect North America internally from
another red scare and an externally from a Soviet attack.
35
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Missile Defense
NATO was a paper document, but it needed actual military backing. In North America, that
backing came first in the form of missile defense. During this era of convergence, Canada
actively cooperated with the United States through agency relations rather than personal
diplomacy to create early warning systems because they shared the same security concerns as the
United States. As early as 1946, statesmen in Canada and the United States thought of the
possibility of building a radar chain in the Arctic to give advanced warning of a Soviet attack.
However, it was not until 1951 that the United States and Canada created the Pinetree Line, the
first of three different radar systems. 38 The Pinetree line consisted of 44 radar stations that
stretched across the northern border of the United States and the southern border of Canada. The
project was officially completed by 1954, but by then a new radar defense project was already in
motion: the Mid-Canada Line. 39 The Mid-Canada Line, also known as the McGill Fence,
stretched along the fifty-fifth parallel, north of the Pinetree Line. Canada was interested in the
McGill Fence for three different reasons. To begin with, Canada had the technical capacity
available domestically as Canadian scientists at McGill University had recently developed the
radar technology. Canada also viewed the project as a way to save money since building radar
stations in the middle of the country would be more affordable than trying to build a chain of
radar stations in the Arctic. Lastly, the Mid-Canada Line avoided the issue of an American
presence by being a purely Canadian-funded and operated project. By the time the project was
finished in 1957, Canada had built 98 radar stations at the cost of $250 million. 40 The Mid-
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Canada line demonstrated Canada’s commitment to the United States in preventing the Cold War
from becoming a hot war.
In November 1954, the United States and Canada decided that a more sophisticated radar
system was needed and agreed to build the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line). The DEW
Line was yet another radar system that would warn the governments of a Soviet nuclear attack. 41
The DEW Line was to be located above the Mid-Canada Line across the Canadian Arctic.
During the Cold War, thousands of men from across the continent, ranging from civilians and
military officials to engineers, were sent by the United States military to the Arctic to help create
this new warning system. In order to strengthen Canadian sovereignty claims as U.S. troops
began to flood the region, Canada relocated Inuit families to the High Arctic and employed them
wherever possible. 42 Inuit presence on radar sites effectively increased Canadian participation in
the project, at least on the surface. The original DEW Line agreement with Canada stated that
American forces should avoid contact with local Inuit unless they were employed and had the
approval of Canada’s Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources: “All contact with
Eskimos, other than those whose employment on any aspect of the project is approved, is to be
avoided except in cases of emergency.” 43 American troops were told that Inuit were “susceptible
to disease,” thus contact was not allowed. Over time, however, the nations relaxed the clause as
it was rarely ever enforced by the local military authority; soon, many Inuit found themselves
working side by side with the American and Canadian military. 44
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Since Canada had taken responsibility for creating the Mid-Canada line, the U.S. agreed
to fund the construction and the installation of the DEW Line as long as the Canadian
government agreed to assist the US operation whenever necessary. 45 In a note sent to U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles from the United States’ Canadian Ambassador Doug Stuart
in November 1954, Canada informed the United States of its DEW Line proposal:
The Canadian Government has now considered a proposal put forward through
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence that the construction of the Distant Early
Warning element of the over-all joint Canada-United States warning system
should be the responsibility of the United States Government. The Canadian
Government concurs in this proposal subject to the conclusion at an early date of
an agreement as to the terms which shall govern the work. At the same time,
however, the Canadian Government wishes to state its intention to participate in
the project, the nature and extent of such participation to be determined in the
near future. 46
The project was completed in 1957 and consisted of 22 radar stations. The cooperation between
the two allies helped create what was believed to be an effective early warning radar system that
would mutually defend both nations.
The DEW Line was a product of the United States’ fear of an attack by the Soviet Union
via air bombers and ICBMs as the Cold War continued to escalate. The United States needed
Canada to build up its early warning system in order to protect the continent from a Soviet aerial
offensive. If Canada could protect itself from the Soviets, it would in turn be protecting its
southern neighbor. It was in the self-interest of the United States to build the DEW Line in
Canada; Canadians naturally agreed to the building of this project because they too benefited
from the safeguard that the DEW Line provided. The United States Air Force was responsible for
evaluating the radar sites and served as communication liaison for the United States for the
45
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supply and service centers. 47 Militarily, the DEW Line was a necessity for U.S. defense.
Politically, the DEW Line allowed for a larger U.S. presence in Canada for the staffing of radar
stations. This later became a point of tension between the United States and Canada as
sovereignty issues emerged, despite the fact that the United States agreed that Canadian
sovereignty in the north would not be compromised as a result of the project. 48 Other historians
however, argue that Canada’s media and opponents of the DEW Line made the controversy
about sovereignty bigger than it actually was by highlighting the fact that the U.S. exercised its
right to turn away Canadian visitors without security authorization. 49 For the most part, Canadian
officials agreed that the Americans were respectful of Canada’s concerns about sovereignty and
acknowledged Canadian control of the Arctic.

50

The authors of Arctic Front argued, “The DEW

Line contributed more to Canadian sovereignty in the North than it took away from it.” The
DEW Line was not a sovereignty issue; rather it helped the United States and Canada unite under
the recently created North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) to meet the need of an
intercontinental defense system.
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The missile defense systems, that were made up of radar

systems and anti-ballistic missiles developed by Canada and the United States, demonstrate how
the cooperation amongst government agencies strengthened the joint defense of the two nations.

NORAD
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), headquartered in Colorado Springs, was
another mutual defense program in which the United States and Canada collaborated. NORAD is
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a bilateral defense organization between the U.S. and Canada that was established to coordinate
the military cooperation of the two nations in the creation of the early warning systems in
Canada. In September 1957, the two nations created the NORAD agreement to defend, protect,
and control the air space of North America during the war. 52 It was not until nine months later on
May 12, 1958 that the agreement was officially announced. 53 Even before the nation’s leaders
announced the agreement, military leaders from both the U.S. and Canada were already
cooperatively working with one another to make joint defense possible. NORAD is further
evidence of the productivity of military cooperation as opposed to personal diplomacy during the
Cold War.
The new defense command was responsible for the coordination of defense production
and the development of sharing agreements between the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF). 54 The two air forces were developed and operated the early
warning radar sites and systems, which acted as a “trip wire” against air attacks. For Canada,
NORAD was an opportunity to defend itself and their U.S. ally from the threat of a Soviet attack.
Typically, the Commander of NORAD is a U.S. military officer and the Deputy Commander is
usually Canadian. This is indicative of the junior role that Canada plays compared to its southern
ally. 55 Despite its junior role, Canada’s partnership was essential for this mutual defense
agreement because of the way that it benefitted the Canadian government and military.
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According to the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba in
Canada, NORAD allowed Canada the following defensive benefits:
For Canada, air defence cooperation and subsequently NORAD had other significant
benefits. It provided access to the greater military resources of the U.S. through which the
U.S. provided, for example, majority funding for relevant NORAD infrastructure in
Canada. This infrastructure, in turn, enhanced Canadian sovereignty not just in terms of
control over its expansive air space in the Canadian North, but also through the presence
of ground installations across the North. It gave Canada access to U.S. air defence plans,
thereby ensuring unique Canadian air defence requirements would be taken into account.
It was also Canada’s entry point into the strategic world. NORAD’s missions required
access to vital intelligence on Soviet capabilities, which Canada could not acquire on its
own. 56
During the Cold War, NORAD also allowed Canada to assert its national sovereignty through
the use of air patrols, infrastructure, and surveillance. The benefits of participating in NORAD
with the United States far outweighed the cost of joint defense with the United States. Due to the
vastness of the Canadian geography, Canada struggled to assert sovereignty over its territory;
however, through NORAD the United States promised to partner with Canada and ensure that its
national sovereignty remains intact.
For the United States, NORAD was another military maneuver, designed like NATO, to
achieve a political outcome. In 1950, in National Security Council Document 68, the United
States government concluded that the best way to combat the communist Soviet threat in the East
was to build up its military arsenal, including nuclear weapons. 57 The document also argued for a
containment approach to communism through the development of a “healthy international
community” with other like-minded nations. 58 NSC 68 argued:
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We must by means of a rapid and sustained build up, of the political, economic,
and military strength of the free-world, and by means of an affirmative progress
intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing
evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the
Kremlin design dominated by its will. 59
NSC 68 outlined the need for the United States to not only build up its military weapons but also
its political weapons in the form of joint defense agreements with allied nations of the free
world. NORAD was product of this new policy. In this sense, the NORAD agreement helped
secure freedom and democracy against communism. While NORAD was a military defense
agreement, it served the political purpose of strengthening the allied relationship between the
U.S. and Canada. In March 1981, NORAD was renamed to the North American Aerospace
Defense Command to “include the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and the detection,
validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space
vehicles,” as according to the defense command. The incorporation of space defense was the
product of the space race between the U.S. and USSR. NORAD was the first bilateral and
binational agreement ever to be made between two nations. The NORAD agreement reflects the
success of state level diplomacy and military cooperation in creating a joint defense command in
the face of Soviet aggression.

BOMARC Missile and a North American Nuclear Policy
A new era of divergence filled with tension and hostility began to emerge after Canada’s
acceptance into NORAD. As a new member of NORAD, Canada needed to build up its air
defense in order to meet the requirements that were established in the NORAD agreement. The
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BOMARC (Boeing-Michigan Aeronautical Research Center) missile was a ground to air missile
that was designed to carry a nuclear warhead. It could help Canada satisfy NORAD’s
requirements; however, at the time Canada lacked nuclear warheads. By September 1958,
Canadian defense officials began debating whether it was in the best interest of the nation to
acquire nuclear warheads from the United States to strengthen their joint defense.

60

The desire

to obtain nuclear warheads contrasted with Canada’s international policy that stated that Canada
was opposed to the spreading of nuclear weapons. Canada’s Atomic Energy Control Board was
created in 1946 under the Atomic Energy Control Act. 61 This Board, despite working with the
United States on the Manhattan Project, chose to have a non-nuclear weapons policy after
witnessing the devastation that the atomic bombs had caused. By 1958, however, the United
States urged Canada to incorporate nuclear missiles as part of its fulfillment of the NORAD
agreement. Canadian leadership tried to appease these conflicting initiatives by emphasizing the
defensive nature of the country’s nuclear goals. In January 1960, Prime Minister John G.
Diefenbaker (1957-1963) prepared the following message for the Canadian Armed Forces:
The Government believes in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons at the
independent disposal of national governments. We are planning arrangements
now for arming the Canadian forces with defensive weapons using nuclear
warheads, which will be consistent with this principle. Our need for such weapons
will arise only in defensive operations taken jointly with the forces of the United
States. 62
In 1960, Diefenbaker was prepared to accept the nuclear warhead for the BOMARC missile;
however Canada did not receive it until 1963 when Lester B. Pearson was elected Prime
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Minister. Diefenbaker received public criticism for even considering a shift in policy, which
delayed his decision and marked the beginning of the BOMARC missile “crisis.”
Canadian newspapers in 1963 shared a common theme claiming that the buildup of
Canada’s defense was a role that was long delayed, yet a role that should be readily accepted. At
the time, the Canadian public was embarrassed to learn that their country still failed to meet the
NORAD requirements and urged their government officials to do whatever it took to meet
NORAD demands, even if it meant accepting a new nuclear defense policy. 63 In the Montreal
Gazette on January 7, 1963, the newspaper reflected popular Canadian public opinion when it
reported that, “This [failure] is a serious and embarrassing situation.” Despite the feeling of
embarrassment that some people had, public opinion in Canada was split regarding the decision
of Canada accepting to nuclear weapons. On January 15, 1963, the Toronto Daily Star published
their statement of opposition to the acceptance of nuclear arms by Canada. Joseph Atkinson,
President and publisher of the Star argued that the United States should be in possession of the
nuclear weapons, not Canada:
It will be a step in that dangerous direction if Canada accepts atomic missiles—
even one of relatively limited capacity. Such a development will increase the
pressure on the United States to supply nuclear arms to its other allies, in Asia as
well as Europe. 64
Atkinson believed that the buildup of nuclear weapons in Canada would only prolong the nuclear
arms race rather than promote the peace that Canada was committed to maintaining. 65 Yet
Samuel Lubell, a public opinion reporter and an American freelance journalist, learned through
interviewing Canadians that “the confidence of the Canadian public in the BOMARCs had been
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just about destroyed.” Meanwhile, other Canadian voters resented the testimony of Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara, which was widely interpreted as meaning, ‘the BOMARCs are just
decoys to draw fire away from American cities.’’ 66 Political tensions within the Canadian
government at this time along with a divide in public opinion delayed Canada’s decision to
obtain nuclear weapons to strengthen its joint defense with the United States at the height of the
Cold War.
The BOMARC missile was not only designed to meet the needs of NORAD, but also to
assert Canadian defense power and to reestablish Canada as a “little great power” in the midst of
the Cold War. 67 The BOMARC was designed to replace the AVRO Arrow. The AVRO Arrow
was an jet interceptor designed to destroy air attacks, however, it proved to be ineffective in an
era of nuclear weapons and missile technology. 68 Although BOMARC was an American-made
missile, Canada requested BOMARC missiles for its defense program. For the RCAF, I was
hoped that the BOMARC missile provided air defense against Soviet missiles and aircraft. 69 The
BOMARC missile was also an opportunity for Canada to recover from the financially draining
AVRO Arrow project and replace air bombers with nuclear warheads. 70 Canada received 56
BOMARCs in 1961, which the United States paid for while Canada paid for the military sites
that would host the missiles near North Bay, Ontario.
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Ironically, by the time Canada received the BOMARCs, the United States began to
question the military effectiveness of the BOMARC but by then it was too late; Canada had
already committed to the missile program. Although Prime Minister Diefenbaker agreed to
purchase the missile from the Americans, he refused to purchase the nuclear missile warhead that
would make the weapon effective. This resulted in a dispute between the United States and
Canada as to how the BOMARC missile ought to be utilized. In a 1958 test, a BOMARC missile
successfully intercepted a Navaho missile flying off of Cape Canaveral, Florida despite earlier
U.S. Army reports that the missile was an ineffective military weapon. The missile testing
reassured Canada that the BOMARC missile was indeed a worthy investment.
Although Diefenbaker never made an executive decision on the new proposed nuclear
defense policy, his Liberal opponent Pearson, argued that Canada ought to adopt the new policy
in order to meet the requirements of NORAD and NATO and to better support its allies. The
controversy between the United States and Canada highlighted the different approaches that the
two nations had towards national defense and fueled the already soaring tensions between
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker. 71 The nuclear weapon controversy also led
to a split within Diefenbaker’s own Cabinet, all of which aided the election of Prime Minister
Pearson in September 1963. The BOMARC “missile crisis,” as it is now commonly remembered,
was not so much a military crisis as it was a diplomatic crisis between the United States and
Canada as the nations sought the most efficient and cost effective way to defend the North
American continent.
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Once Canada agreed to add nuclear weapons to its arsenal, a new issue arose: who would
have control over the nuclear devices? The United States paid and produced the weapons;
therefore the BOMARCs were U.S. property. Canada readily allowed the U.S. to claim
ownership due to the fact that Canada had committed to a peacekeeping approach to defense that
included not having nuclear weapons. Jurisdiction and sovereignty issues arose once the
BOMARCs were moved onto Canadian soil. Canada claimed that since the BOMARCs were on
Canadian soil, Canada had the authority to control and use the devices as they deemed
appropriate. This was not the first time when the United States faced this sovereignty issue. In
Britain, in order to avoid jurisdiction dispute with the nuclear weapons, the nations agreed to the
“dual-key” system. The dual-key system imposed a policy in which both an American and a
British officer had to jointly arm the nuclear weapon before it was used. This was done so that
Britain had the opportunity to veto the use of the weapons and not be “pulled unwittingly” into
an American nuclear war. Although the dual-key system was successful in Britain, the United
States was hesitant to adopt the same system in North America. 72 In a 1961 memorandum for
President Kennedy, the White House secretary recorded the following report regarding the
meeting between Kennedy and Diefenbaker on February 20:
The President and the Prime Minister met at the White House. In the course of a
long discussion, the Prime Minister raised with the President the question of the
“joint defense of North America.” Although there was no commitment by the
Prime Minister to any nuclear weapons posture, the text of the memorandum of
conversations indicates the Prime Minister suggested to the President that the
United States and Canada conclude a nuclear weapons agreement similar to that
between the United States and the United Kingdom. 73
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Diefenbaker’s proposed dual key system called for nuclear weapons to not be held on Canadian
soil so that it would not interfere with its claim to be a non-nuclear power. The system also
allowed Canada the same veto privileges as it did Britain. Diefenbaker wanted the BOMARCs to
be held on U.S. soil and then shuttled across the border in the event of a crisis that would involve
Canada to change its stance on nuclear weapons. This proposition, however, was not practical. 74
The Kennedy administration urged Diefenbaker to change its nuclear policy; however, it was not
until Pearson became Prime Minister in 1963 that Canada officially adopted an agreement with
the United States to obtain nuclear warheads. 75
Historian Patricia I. McMahon summarizes this complex controversy in her book Essence
of Indecision: “No doubt, such an approach [storing nuclear weapons in Canada] would be a
show of good faith [to the United States] in the pursuit of a bipartisan foreign policy (for which
the media had praised the government in the recent campaign), but it could also be construed as a
sign of insecurity and uncertainty.” 76 The Canadian government feared that complying with the
United States’ request would be a sign of weakness rather than evidence of a strong joint defense
between the two nations. By the end of 1962, Diefenbaker’s indecision contributed to his
government’s fall and his nation without nuclear weapons.
In a speech given in January of 1963, Pearson stated that Canada’s new nuclear policy
was created because “Canada must continue the closest possible co-operation with the United
States and with her friends in NATO. She must do nothing to weaken continental or NATO
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collective policy and action.” 77 Pearson’s new administration ushered in a dramatic change from
Diefenbaker’s conservative politics, promising Canadians that they would honor their historic
commitment to the United States to not only strengthen Canada but also to better protect her
from the threat of the Soviet Union.
The creation of the BOMARC missile brought change to U.S. defense policy. In a letter
to Senator Dennis Chavez (Democrat- New Mexico), the chairman of the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy wrote the following about the
United States’ new defense strategy:
In our planning for the protection of the North American continent against air
attack, we visualize a defense in depth which consists of three stages. The first
attempt to destroy or turn back invading aircraft would be made by our
interceptors, supersonic planes which would meet the enemy as far out from our
own borders as can be done. The second state would be furnished by the Bomarc
which, in the new version, will have a range of 400 miles. Again, the attempt
would be to reach out and intercept the attacker as he comes closer to but before
he reaches our continental borders. Finally, as a third stage, the Nike Hercules
would be sited for additional close-in protection of high priority targets. 78
McElroy believed that the BOMARC had the potential to redefine the way the United States
defended itself from the Soviet Union due to its long missile range, and this relied on
cooperation with Canada. However, as mentioned previously, U.S. military officials argued that
that the missile was ineffective.
For Canada, the BOMARC “crisis” revealed the distrust that Canada still had toward
American diplomacy, yet the incident also highlighted the willingness of the Canadian
government to incorporate nuclear missiles into its military upon request of the United States.
Despite all of the criticism the Canadian government received for their decision, they stood by
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their commitment to their ally. Although many military officials in the United States did not like
the BOMARC missile due to the fact that they believed it to be militarily ineffective, the United
States could not deny the Canadian effort to satisfy the NORAD requirement of obtaining
nuclear weapons for their arsenal.

The Herbert Norman Affair
Even in the midst of cooperation within NATO, NORAD, and the BOMARC “missile crisis,” by
the late 1950s, Canadians developed a sort of wariness of American policy (though not
Americans) and worried about becoming too closely aligned with American Cold War policy
initiatives. This change in public opinion toward American policy came in the wake of the death
of Herbert Norman, a Canadian diplomat in Egypt. As a student in the 1930s, he was a member
of a communist club at Oxford. By the mid-1950s Norman was outed as a communist and
hounded by the McCarthyite House Committee on Un-American Activities as the United States
became infected by the Red Scare. Distraught, he committed suicide. Although it is not fair to
conclude that American policy in the form of McCarthyism resulted in Norman’s death, this is
exactly what the Canadian public concluded. In a House of Commons debate on April 4, 1957,
Prime Minister Diefenbaker captured the Canadian sentiment when he stated, “I think all of us in
this house cannot but feel a sense of deep sorrow that this man’s good name was filched from
him by indiscriminately branding him as an enemy, trying him by suspicion and, in the public
mind to great extent, convicting him by innuendo.” 79 Norman was a public figure, and Canadians
viewed the suicide of their diplomat as a need for Canada to distance themselves from American
diplomacy. On April 4, 1957, the Toronto Daily Star reported on the incident:
79
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Norman was reported by associates to have been depressed in recent days over the
continuing attempts by the U.S. subcommittee to smear him. As late as March 28
the sub-committee on internal security, ignoring protests both by Canada and its
own state department, released further testimony alleging that Norman had been
linked with communism. The U.S. state department, following Canada’s protest
over release of similar material March 14, had asked the sub-committee not to
release the later testimony because ‘it might be damaging to our friendly relations
with Canada.’ The state department repudiated the sub-committee allegations
against Norman, saying that they did not represent the opinions of the U.S.
government. 80
Despite the U.S. State Department’s attempt to rid itself of the blame for Norman’s death,
Canadian media was already holding the United States responsible. In the very same newspaper,
William Stevenson reported that Herbert Norman’s death was a result of the United States witchhunt of communists; meanwhile another Canadian reporter Bruce MacDonald of the Toronto
Daily Star titled his article following the death of Norman “Murdered by Slander.” Canada’s
media fueled public distrust toward the United States as they blamed the United States (more
specifically McCarthy and the House for Un-American Activities Committee) for harassing
Norman into suicide. 81
In response to the outcry of the public, Canada decided to cut off security information to
the United States in hopes of avoiding another diplomatic nightmare. In a 1957 letter to Norman
Robertson the Canadian Ambassador in the United States, Lester Pearson, then the Canadian
Secretary of State for External Affairs, delivered the following message to the United States, “I
am instructed by my Government to inform you with regret that the Canadian Government will
be unable in future to supply any security information concerning a Canadian citizen to any US
Government agency.” In a latter part of Pearson’s letter, however, he wrote assuredly that
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Canada has no desire “to upset in any way the long standing and friendly relations between the
FBI and the RCM Police. Nor do we wish to upset the new and satisfactory relations between the
US Immigration and Naturalization Service and the RCM Police.” 82 Despite the distrust that the
Canadian public seemed to have toward the United States after Norman’s death, the Canadian
government had to balance public pressure with the real need to maintain the good relations with
the United States. It can be argued that the only reason why Canada chose to cut off its security
information to the U.S. was to appease the Canadian public. Pearson’s letter appears to assure the
United States that despite the public reaction, Canada was not ready to ruin the allies’
relationship.

Cuban Missile Crisis
The response of the Canadian public combined with the new military shift toward to the
BOMARC missiles resulted in a major diplomatic crisis between the United States and Canada.
Add to this the fact that Kennedy and Diefenbaker already had mounting tensions in their
political relationship, a darkening cloud emerged over the Canada-US relationship.
The Cuban missile crisis began on October 14, 1962 when an American U2 spy plane
flying over Cuba photographed the construction of several Intermediate Range Ballistic missile
(IRBMs) deployment sites built by the Soviet Union. The U2 spy plane revealed that the Soviets
were building up an arsenal of nuclear missiles in Cuba. After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion
(April 1961), Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Cuban Premier Fidel Castro made a deal
that allowed the Soviets to place nuclear weapons on Cuba to prevent another attempt by the
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United States to invade Cuba. Cuba received the benefit of Soviet protection from the United
States, while the Soviets received the benefit of having a military arsenal right off the coast of
the United States at the height of the Cold War between the two nations. 83 Now, the Soviets
could challenge their enemy right in its own backyard. Kennedy and his National Security
Council agreed that it was unacceptable for the Soviets to place their missiles there, as it
threatened the lives of innocent Americans. The question at hand was how to convince the
Soviets to remove their missiles without triggering a nuclear conflict. 84
U.S. President Kennedy received a briefing about the missiles in Cuba on October 16,
1962, yet he chose not to consult world leaders until a few days into the crisis. There is no
evidence that Kennedy even considered consulting Diefenbaker. In fact, the only communication
that Kennedy had with Diefenbaker was a letter on October 19 asking Canada for support of a
UN resolution calling for a moratorium on nuclear testing. 85 Three days later, in a telegram on
October 22, 1962 (one week after Kennedy was first informed), Kennedy wrote the following
message informing Diefenbaker just before his address to the American people:
My dear Prime Minister:
I am asking Ambassador Merchant to deliver to you the text of a public
statement I intend to make today at 1900 hours Washington time. It is occasioned
by the fact that we are now in the possession of clear evidence which Ambassador
Merchant will explain to you, that the Soviets have secretly installed offensive
nuclear weapons in Cuba, and that some of them are already operational.
As you will see from my speech, I consider that the situation calls for the
immediate execution of certain quarantine measures whose object is to prevent
the introduction into Cuba of further nuclear weapons, and to lead to the
elimination of the missiles that are already in place. 86
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The telegram is evidence of the fact that Diefenbaker was informed about the crisis only hours
before Kennedy addressed the American people about the U.S. plan of action. In a meeting with
U.S. Ambassador Livingston Merchant to discuss Kennedy’s address to the nation, Diefenbaker
had the following response according to a memorandum of the conversation recorded by a
secretary:
Mr. Diefenbaker, after inquiring as to when the President’s message was
delivered to Khrushchev [via press conference with the American people] and
after commenting that he was himself a politician, said “let us face facts; an
election is on the United States”; that he could understand that the President might
find his speech to be politically helpful but that the quarantine was dangerous and
a threat to Allies of the United States. The United States was not only informing
the Soviet Union of what it knew, it was challenging the Soviet Union. 87
Diefenbaker believed that Kennedy’s speech was too provocative and that the quarantine might
provoke the Soviet Union to respond aggressively. Diefenbaker was initially alarmed and taken
aback by the aggressive tone of Kennedy’s speech, however by the end of the meeting
Diefenbaker’s response shifted from “skepticism” and “antagonism” to a more “friendly and
cooperative manner.” 88 Despite the meeting ending well, Diefenbaker was offended that the
Canadians were not informed of the crisis sooner. Under the NORAD agreement, Diefenbaker
expected Kennedy to consult with him in a joint decision-making process. Instead, Kennedy
disregarded the consultation and made his own decision regarding the crisis. 89
Diefenbaker also doubted Kennedy’s assessment of the situation at hand. After hearing
Kennedy give the address, Diefenbaker proposed that a UN commission visit Cuba to determine
whether the U.S. intelligence was indeed accurate. Washington interpreted this as a lack of trust
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in the United States. 90 According to historians John H. Thompson and Stephen J. Randall in
Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies,
Diefenbaker feared that Kennedy was too determined to erase the Bay of Pigs and
the rumors that he had been routed by Khrushchev at Vienna and on Berlin.
“Kennedy”, he [Diefenbaker] wrote, “was perfectly capable of taking the world to
the brink of thermonuclear destruction to prove himself the man for our times, a
courageous champion of Western democracy.” 91
The failure of the United States’ invasion of Cuba still very eminent in Canada’s memory. What
later became known as the Bay of Pigs fiasco, was an attempt by the United States and Cuban
rebels to overthrow the communist regime of Fidel Castro. The objective was for the CIA to train
anti-Castro Cuban exiles (who became known as the Cuban Freedom Brigade) to lead a rebellion
against their communist government. Despite the efforts of the U.S. government to keep the
operation covert, Cuban intelligence loyal to Castro learned of the plans. Although President
Eisenhower was responsible for creating the military operation, the operation was launched
under Kennedy’s administration on April 17,1961. Even though the operation was no longer
covert, Kennedy authorized the invasion plan anyway. In hopes of disguising U.S. support, the
U.S. ordered the invasion to be launched from the Bay of Pigs, which was a remote swampy area
off the southern coast of Cuba where a night invasion would have been extremely unlikely. The
initial plan called for two air strikes, a 1,400- man invasion force, Cuban locals to join the
invasion, and the establishment of a provisional government. American historian Arthur
Schlesinger advised Kennedy on the military operation in a memorandum to the President,
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I am in favor of a continuation and expansion of the present approach to Cuba—
i.e., quiet infiltration, of anti-Castro exiles into Cuba and subsequent support
through air drops. The beachhead operation, with the landing and recognition of
the provisional government would represent, however, a change of highly
beneficial result of getting rid of the Castro regime. 92
Schlesigner suggested that Kennedy expand the operation in order to include the complete
abolishment of the Castro regime. Despite the scholarly advice and alterations to the plan, the
invasion failed miserably due to obsolete U.S. bombers missing their targets, poor weather
conditions, lack of ammunition for the Cuban rebels, and a strong counterattack by the Cuban
military that quickly crushed the rebellion. The invasion began on April 17, 1961 and was
crushed by April 19, only two days later. Most of the rebel forces were imprisoned after
surrendering, while others were killed during the struggle. After learning of the failure of the
invasion, Kennedy vowed that the brigade flag of the Cuban rebels would soon be returned to a
free Havana. Since the invasion, Kennedy was desperately trying to make up for the failure at the
Bay of Pigs. 93 Diefenbaker believed that Kennedy was using the Cuban missile crisis as a means
to make up for this failure. Diefenbaker argued that the Bay of Pigs clouded Kennedy’s judgment
in making an appropriate response to the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis. 94
Although Diefenbaker eventually came to terms with the intelligence provided, he did not
give Kennedy the blank check of support that the U.S. president sought; in fact, he refused to
even put Canadian troops on heightened alert until his Defence Minister pressed him to do so. 95
Diefenbaker proposed that the crisis be turned over to the United Nations so that they could
survey the land in Cuba and provide their own analysis of the situation. Some Canadians
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including the Minister of External Affairs, Howard Green, accused the United States of being too
hostile with the Soviet Union and criticized the U.S. for their unwillingness to negotiate.

96

Historians John Herd Thompson and Stephen Randall argue in their book Canada and the United
States: Ambivalent Allies that for Canada the biggest questions of the Cuban missile crisis were:
“Why use an ultimatum rather than negotiations; were the missiles in Cuba a real threat to the
United States or only to the president’s prestige?” 97 The conservatism of the Diefenbaker
government clashed with the liberalism of the Kennedy administration thus creating different
approaches to the Cuban crisis. Diefenbaker’s unwillingness to support Kennedy and Canada’s
recalcitrant response to the Cuban missile crisis increased already hostile personal relations
between the Prime Minister and the President. Diefenbaker blamed Kennedy’s “arrogance” for
getting North America into this crisis. 98
Eventually, Diefenbaker conceded to NATO’s decision to put troops on alert and
supported a blockade if the United States were to go to war. 99 War never actually broke out
between the Soviet Union and the United States, as diplomatic negotiations successfully diffused
the situation; however, the crisis altered the relationship between the United States and Canada
due to Diefenbaker’s delayed response. During the crisis, it is evident that the failed personal
relationship between Diefenbaker and Kennedy affected the political decisions. It can be argued
that Kennedy’s failure to notify Diefenbaker of the crisis when it immediately occurred affected
Diefenbaker’s delayed response and mistrust of U.S. intelligence. As the United States closest
ally, Kennedy should have brought the Canadians up to speed so that they could consult with one
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another before making any decisions. 100 It is also necessary to note that during this time Canada
had an “enduring policy” with Cuba because Diefenbaker shared a common ground with Fidel
Castro as both leaders sought to work with the United States while also rejecting their political
dominance.

101

In a document brief on Canadian trade with Cuba dated December 23, 1960,

Canada is cited as having “no limitations on such trade with Cuba.” 102 Historian Asa McKercher
argues that Diefenbaker’s “antiyanquismo” (anti-american) attitude affected his ability to react
appropriately to the Cuban missile crisis. 103 Diefenbaker’s delayed response to the crisis
increased tensions between the two nations. Kennedy was furious at Canada’s response and as a
result put more pressure on Canada to resolve the nuclear weapons controversy within
Canada. 104
For the United States, the Cuban missile crisis was the highlight of Kennedy’s
administration as he was credited with ending the nuclear threat quickly and peacefully through
diplomatic negotiations. Instead of threatening war, Kennedy sanctioned an American naval
blockade of Cuba until the Soviet Union agreed to remove its missiles from the island. Despite
Canadian criticism that Kennedy failed to consult Canada before making this decision, it is clear
that when Kennedy met with his advisors in secret, he decided to not inform any NATO
members, not just Canada. Kennedy and his advisors feared that the intelligence would leak if he
tried to inform other nations and they did not want the Soviet Union or Cuba to know that the
United States had discovered the missiles. Another Canadian criticism was that the United States
was too aggressive and hostile in its dealing with the USSR; however, it was Kennedy’s
100
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willingness to provide an ultimatum that prevented a nuclear war. Kennedy later accused the
Diefenbaker government of being unwilling to clearly see the situation at hand.

105

Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s hesitancy and his push for a UN-led action rather than a
U.S.-led action brought the personal tensions between Diefenbaker and Kennedy to a peak.
Diefenbaker believed that Canada could serve as a mediator between Cuba and the United States
however Kennedy viewed this approach as completely unhelpful and instead asked Canada to
help the United States pay for its economic and naval embargo of Cuba. 106 Diefenbaker refused
to accede this request. Furthermore, Canada continued its trade relationship with Cuba thus
diminishing the Canadian role in aiding the United States in the midst of the crisis.
Fortunately for Canadian and American diplomats, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and
President Kennedy agreed on a deal. The Soviets removed their Cuban missiles and the United
States agreed not to invade Cuba and to remove missiles in Turkey. This compromise led to the
defusing of the Cuban missile crisis despite the fact that the Cold War continued to rage on.
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The continuation of the Cold War also meant the continuation of cooperation but also relational
dissonance between the United States and Canada.
The dissonance between the U.S. and Canada in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis
actually proved to be beneficial for the United States. Diefenbaker’s refusal to aid the U.S. naval
blockade of Cuba benefited the United States because Canada was able to informally gather
intelligence for the U.S. 108 Dissonance between the political leaders ironically strengthened the
joint defense between the two allies after the Cuban crisis because not only were they able to
protect the North American continent from the Soviets, but it also encouraged the United States
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to look to Canada for intelligence, trade, and political relationship with Cuba. Due to its
geographic location and proximity to the continental United States, a stable relationship with
Cuba was important to the United States. The ultimatum that the United States made with the
Soviet Union made this stability impossible without the aid and assistance of their Canadian ally.

The Cold War’s Impact on Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty
When the Cuban missile crisis ended, the United States and Canada were able to shift some of
their attention back to the Arctic as they focused on protecting their northern flank from the
Soviets. Defense of the Arctic became necessary for Canada as the conditions to claim
sovereignty changed. In order to claim sovereignty a nation must demonstrate actual occupation
and the ability to manage, regulate, police, and protect that territory. Canadian Rangers (largely
made up of Inuit) played a key role in demonstrating Canada's ability to demonstrate these sets
of requirements by patrolling the region; In fact, the Rangers were sometimes referred to as
Canada’s “sovereignty soldiers.” 109 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nations could
simply stake their land claim by putting down a flag and then returning home to their mother
country to inform her of the new territory gained. During the post-World War II era, that all
changed. Nations now had to demonstrate political and military presence in order to claim
sovereignty. As the Cold War continued, the United States had an increasingly larger presence in
the Arctic as they partnered with Canada in defending the region. While Canada needed the
defense help from the United States, there was an underlying fear that the United States would
109

Whitney Lackenbauer, The Canadian Rangers (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013), pgs. 8-23.
The Canadian Rangers are a grassroots force of citizen soldiers who work to defend Canada’s borders,
conduct search and rescue missions, and serve as scouts to the Canadian Army. Rangers do not go overseas
as their primary mission is to preserve and protect Canada’s national sovereignty. The basic mandate of the
Rangers is “to provide a military presence in sparsely settled northern, coastal, and isolated areas of Canada
that cannot conveniently or economically be provided for by other components of the Canadian forces.”
About 86% of the Northern patrols were made of Inuit peoples of the Arctic.

41

attempt to claim sovereignty due to the fact that they now had a military presence there.
Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, the Soviets were a far greater threat than the United
States was, therefore Canada knew that a strong alliance with the United States was necessary.
As the authors of Arctic Front stated, “The winds of war blew closer to Canada, and isolation no
longer suggested security but vulnerability.” 110 With isolation no longer an option, joint defense
was imperative in the Arctic.
In the new Cold War context, skilled foot soldiers such as the Rangers were no longer
enough to provide defense of the Arctic. New technologies had to be employed to provide an
adequate defense of the region, and chief among them was the submarine. In a 2013 article of the
Cold War History, Dr. Adam Lajeunesse, a historian at the University of Calgary in Alberta,
discusses the importance of the Canadian-American defense relationship in the Arctic with the
development of under-ice submarines. Lajeunesse challenges the argument that the American
submarine program in the Canadian Arctic was a secret program that undermined Canadian
sovereignty. From his intensive research, Lajeunesse learned that the under-ice submarine
program was very much a cooperative venture by the Americans and Canadians that proved vital
to North American defense during the Cold War. 111 Between 1960 and 1986, there were eight
different U.S. Navy voyages, and historical documents indicate that the Canadians knew about
the majority of the voyages. Only two of the voyages, USS Spadefish and USS Pintado, that took
place lack immediate evidence to support Canadian concurrence or active participation. 112
Although the United States rarely asked for permission to voyage through the Arctic waters,
Canada chose to be non-confrontational. Lajeunesse describes the situation:
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As the United States had proven itself unwilling to request formal permission for
these transits, Canada had only two options: to declare sovereignty outright and
demand compliance or to work with the Americans and assert as much control as
possible on a functional basis. 113
Canada chose to cooperate with the United States in order to keep the status quo and not start any
more foreign relation problems; they already had enough to worry about with the threat of the
Soviet Union. 114 Canada opted for this discreet approach because it did not want the United
States to do anything that could possibly threaten Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and wanted
to avoid potential public outcry through the media. Cooperation was the only way to keep the
peace between the two nations. This approach to foreign policy proved very successful, but
mostly because, according to Lajeunesse, “the State Department and the U.S. Navy continued to
prove so sensitive and responsive to Canadian concerns,” meaning that there was no attempt by
the U.S. government to undermine Canadian sovereignty. 115
According to Lajeunesse, the primary purpose of the voyages was research. The Soviet
threat in the Arctic failed to materialize therefore the voyages lacked a military strategy other
than standard surveillance. 116 In the early 1960s, the Soviet naval fleet was small and hardly a
threat. Lajeunesse argues that the threat of a Soviet attack was primarily based on “potentiality
rather than existing danger.” 117 In fact, the Canadian Nuclear Powered Submarine Program
reported:
….the USSR can acquire no major military capability which it would otherwise
lack nor can it achieve any strategically significant result. Indeed, one can argue
in all seriousness that there are few areas in which the USSR could achieve less
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for a given expenditure of resources than by deploying its submarines to the
Canadian Arctic 118
Despite popular belief, during the early 1960s, a Cold War theatre in the Arctic was merely
hypothetical rather than an eminent reality.
The lack of military activity in the Arctic did not hinder the Canadian Navy’s effort to
continue its under-ice detection system and technology. The under-ice research was a joint effort
between the Canadian and U.S. navies. The objective of this research was to improve northern
anti-submarine capabilities and to create a fully operational submarine detection network. 119 It
was not until the controversial voyage of the USS Manhattan in 1969 that Canadian defense
policy shifted towards the protection of Arctic sovereignty. 120 Lajeunesse successfully supports
the idea that the United States militarily supported Canada during the Cold War by providing a
strong U.S. presence in the Arctic.

Conclusion: Impact of Joint Defense
From the emergence of NATO to the decline of the Cuban missile crisis, Canada and the United
States worked closely as allies for the joint defense of North America. This era of military
convergence transformed the political relationship between the two nations, which is often
overlooked due to the strained relationship between Diefenbaker and Kennedy, 1957-1963. The
impact of this era of convergence is evident in the Canadian White Paper on Defence that was
drawn up in 1964, approximately one year after the Cuban missile crisis. The White Paper on
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Defence is a primary source document from the Canadian Department of National Defence. 121
The document updated the Canadian government on the latest defense policy during the Cold
War. The Honorable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence in Canada, stated the primary
objective of the Canadian defense policy:
Preserve the peace by supporting collective defense measures to deter military
aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our
participation in international organizations, and to provide for the protection and
surveillance of our territory, our air space and our coastal waters. 122
The document goes on to define the military relationship that Canada had with the U.S. and its
European Allies following the Cuban crisis, with a special emphasis on Canadian partnership
with the United States. In fact, in Section II of the White Paper, the Department of National
Defence lays out “four parallel methods” by which the Canadian defense policy had been shaped
around:
(a) Collective Measures for maintenance of peace and security as embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations, including the search for balanced and
controlled disarmament;
(b) Collective Defence as embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty;
(c) Partnership with the United States in the defence of North America;
(d) National Measures to discharge responsibility for the security and protection
of Canada. 123
The fact that the third most important aspect of Canadian defense policy is Canada’s partnership
with the United States is evidence of how crucial the United States military was to helping
Canada defend North America from a potential Soviet threat in the midst of the Cold War and
also how crucial Canada’s military and political support was to helping the United States. The
White Paper highlights Canada’s inability to defend itself against the Soviet Union without the
help of the United States; “the contribution Canada can make to the deterrence of war is limited
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by the size of our human and material resources.” 124 Canada relied so heavily on the United
States during the Cold War years due to the vast territory it had to defend with limited manpower
and resources. 125 The White Paper on Defence is a direct result of the era of convergence that
was made possible through the joint defense of Canada and the United States from 1949-1963.
Joint Defense between the United States and Canada was crucial to protecting the North
American continent during the Cold War. Without the effectiveness of joint defense, both the
United States and Canada could have succumbed to Soviet aggression in the form of military
attacks. Today, joint defense between these two nations is vital for historians and military
officials to understand as the threat of Russia becoming a dominating world power once again
emerges. In recent news, there is much debate about whether or not the Cold War actually ended.
It is becoming increasingly more evident that the war never ended as new reports of Russia
building up its nuclear arsenal are released. 126 One can argue that the understanding of the
history of joint defense between the United States and Canada is more important now than ever
before.
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